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Conflict in Libya and the Future  
   Risk to the Demining Community
The evolving face of modern warfare in Libya and elsewhere will leave behind an explosives legacy 
that the humanitarian-demining community must manage. This article examines the innovation of 
the anti-government forces in employing modified weaponry and assesses some of the challeng-
es this might bring to humanitarian demining and explosive-ordnance-disposal teams in the future.
by Adrian King [ Allen-Vanguard Ltd. ]
Since the beginning of Libya’s armed conflict, the anti-government militia has desperately sought the means with which to counter the superior military capabil-
ity of the better-trained and equipped pro-Gadhafi military 
forces. Arguably, much of the capability vacuum was filled to 
some extent by NATO’s military intervention, which although 
providing a potent and significant air component on the side 
of the rebels, left anti-government forces disadvantaged, espe-
cially during the initial ground-fighting encounters.
Necessity Drives Innovation
“Necessity is the mother of invention,” wrote Plato. This is 
a rather apt description of the anti-government forces’ predic-
ament at the outset of the conflict and might also be taken to 
mean “desperate situations often breed innovative solutions”; 
and in this, the anti-Gadhafi rebels have on occasion excelled. 
Their ideas were inspired by a glut of available ammunition 
and a chronic lack of the parent weapon systems from which 
to fire and launch it. While certainly innovative, however, the 
rebels have not always reflected on either the viability or the 
safety aspects of modifying or copying military weapon sys-
tems. Initially, the underlying necessity to experiment and de-
velop improvised weapons was in part due to their possession 
57mm air-to-ground aircraft rocket pod prepared 
in a ground-to-ground role mounted on a vehicle 
with improvised launch platform.
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of a very limited array of serviceable military vehicles and the 
personnel trained to operate them. This led to the wholesale 
modification of any suitable motor vehicle to withstand small-
arms fire effects and allow the mounting of heavy weapons to 
provide the mobility of firepower and transport to the area of 
battle much needed at the time.
Improvisation is not entirely limited to vehicle-mounted 
weaponry; dismounted direct and indirect fire systems were 
also invented or modified. The apparent lack of mortar tubes 
and rocket-launch platforms, for example, encouraged a ram-
pant garage industry in designing and building the required 
hardware. Necessity has driven this industry, and although 
many designs are practical under the circumstances, some 
will inevitably be proven unsafe and more of a hazard to the 
user than the intended target.
As anti-Ghadafi forces gained the ascendency, a require-
ment developed to employ weapons with some degree of 
stand-off. This has led to a unique array of sometimes im-
probable constructions that—although not particularly ef-
fective in the majority of cases—gave some degree of capacity 
to fight entrenched forces occupying the towns and villages 
An anti-government militia prepares a homemade 
electric command-initiated firing pack constructed 
from domestic light switches in preparation to fire 
122mm GRAD rockets from an improvised launch-
er in Benghazi, Libya on 19 April 2011.
unfortunate enough to be caught up in 
the conflict. The inaccuracy and rather 
random use of these weapons has prob-
ably had negligible tactical effect, es-
pecially in the early stages, but these 
factors will undoubtedly have contrib-
uted to the human cost of the rebellion.
Weapon Types Employed
Apart from explosive-remnants-
of-war challenges normally anticipat-
ed following armed conflict, demining 
organizations in Libya will likely con-
front improvised weapons and explo-
sive devices that are perhaps different 
from accepted explosive threats within 
the context of humanitarian-demining 
activity. Improvised explosive devices 
used by both sides of the Libyan conflict 
are now a likely escalation as the conflict 
develops with more asymmetric tactics. 
Although the rebels, fighting a superior 
enemy, may have gained more from IED 
employment at the outset, pro-Gadhafi 
forces will probably also use IEDs as 
their resistance continues while resolu-
tion is sought to end the conflict, and 
perhaps in the aftermath.
Even at sea, examples of asymmet-
ric tactics were employed as in the case 
of a high-explosives-laden, rigid-hulled 
boat with two mannequins on board 
that was used as a decoy to attack pa-
trolling naval vessels off the port of 
BMP-1 turret welded to a frame 
mounted on the back of a Toyota Hi-
lux 4x4. This heavily improvised sys-
tem was recorded firing the integral 
73mm gun during the battle of Galaa/
Sofitt Hill, 07 June 2011.
Misrata. The boat was fortunately de-
tected and destroyed (and the explosives 
detonated) by gunfire, but under differ-
ent circumstances this water-borne IED 
could have damaged or even sunk a mil-
itary or commercial vessel. Although 
the means of initiation were never dis-
covered, radio-signal detonation from 
shore was the most probable trigger 
mechanism for this device.
Tactical Warfare Shifts
Libya’s situation is further evidence 
of the altering nature of modern con-
flicts and an indication of what the fu-
ture holds. Conventional military might 
is confronting increasingly asymmet-
ric tactics, where the ill-equipped and 
less-able force compensates for military 
weakness through the employment of 
improvised weapons and IEDs—tacti-
cal weapons with strategic effect. Cer-
tainly in Libya both combatant elements 
have innovated as military hardware is 
destroyed and conventional warfare tac-
tics become less viable.
Preparedness of Demining  
Organizations
With humanitarian-demining per-
sonnel deploying to destabilized countries 
such as Libya, mine-action operations 
must reflect on and mitigate against the 
specific threats through their training re-
gimes and operating procedures.
While planned demining activity 
will always be required, an increasing 
complexity also emerges to the explo-
sive-ordnance-disposal aspects of dem-
ining operations where complex tasks 
are encountered more frequently be-
cause of changing warfare tactics that 
cause greater exposure to such threats. 
Demining organizations face a challeng-
ing future in Libya and elsewhere, and 
improvised weapons and IEDs—some of 
which will be devised locally while others 
will be copies from conflict areas such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq and perhaps Yemen—
will undoubtedly have an effect on oper-
ations. With no on-the-ground Western 
military presence in Libya, demining or-
ganizations will face EOD burdens and 
challenges. Skill levels and operating 
procedures to meet the challenge must 
develop in order to mitigate the cur-
rent and emerging explosive threats, 
and the greater exposure of personnel 
to IEDs, nonconventional explosive de-
vices and weaponry. 
Explosives removed from a Belgian 
PRB-M3A1 anti-tank mine to be used 
in IED manufacturing.
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